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THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PLACE COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT,) 
LLC, CECIL M. PHILLIPS, and ) 
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
____ ~D=e=fu~nd=a=n=ts~, _____________ ) 
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Counter/Cross and 
Third Party-Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY 
FOUNDATION, INC., PLACE 
COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
and CECIL M. PHILLIPS, 
Counter/Cross-Defendants, 
and 
CPD PLASTERING, INC., ST. PAUL 
FIRE AND MARINE INS. CO., TC 
DRYWALL AND PLASTER, INC., THE 
GUARANTEE CO. OF NORTH 
AMERICA USA, ATLANTA DRYWALL 
AND ACOUSTICS, INC., AMERICAN 
SOUTHERN INS. CO., METRO 
WATERPROOFING, INC. and 
WESTERN SURETY CO., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action File No. 2008-CV-156905 
FILED IN OFFICE 
1 
OCT 06 lOW 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR CO IRT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA ' 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
On September 13, 2010, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral 
argument on Defendant Manhattan Construction Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Plaintiff's claims. After hearing the arguments made by counsel, and 
reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion and the record in the case, the Court finds as 
follows: 
In August 2003, Kennesaw State University Foundation ("KSUF") entered into a 
contract with Place Collegiate Development, LLC and Cecil Phillips (collectively "Place") to 
develop a student housing project consisting of two mid-rise dormitories on the Kennesaw 
State University campus ("the Project"). In turn, Place entered into a contract with 
Manhattan Construction Company ("Manhattan") to serve as general contractor and build 
the Project. Original Project plans called for a "building wrap" to be installed over the 
exterior sheathing and underneath the exterior cladding of the Project. However, building 
wrap was not used in the construction of the Project. 
KSUF seeks damages against Place and Manhattan because alleged construction 
defects have allowed water infiltration in to the Project. Such flooding has caused damage 
to the interiors of the project including damage to carpeting, fixtures, furniture and, in some 
instances, personal property. As a result, some units of the dorms were completely 
uninhabitable. 
Manhattan has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff's claims 
premised on three arguments. First, Manhattan argues that KSUF cannot recover against 
Manhattan because there is no privity of contract between them and because Place has 
materially breached the contract. Second, Manhattan argues that KSUF's negligent 
construction claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, Manhattan argues that 
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KSUF's claim concerning the absence of the building wrap is barred by the acceptance 
doctrine. 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-
56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried 
and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, warrant 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 
(1991 ). 
In its first argument, Manhattan contends that there is no privity of contract between 
it and KSUF because the contract between Manhattan and Place expressly states that no 
contractual relationship is created between Manhattan and any other party. While the 
Court finds that KSUF was not a party to the Manhattan-Place contract, it was an intended 
third-party beneficiary that has standing to sue on that contract. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20 (b) 
("The beneficiary of a contract made between other parties for his benefit may maintain an 
action against the promisor on the contract."); Alday v. Decatur Consol. Water Services, 
Inc., 289 Ga. App. 902 (2008) (finding residents of subdivision had standing as third-party 
beneficiaries of contract between water supply provider and developer of subdivision to 
challenge rates for water usage charged by provider). 
As to whether a material breach by Place excuses Manhattan's performance and, 
therefore, bars KSUF's claim, the law in Georgia is that a substantial or material breach by 
one party excuses subsequent performance by the other party. McCoy v. Buckhead Clinic 
Profess. Ass'n, 123 Ga. App. 853 (1971). However, a breach which is incidental and 
subordinate to the main purpose of the contract, and which may be compensated in 
damages, does not warrant a rescission or termination, nor does a mere breach of contract 
not so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the 
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agreement. Mayor and City of Douglasville v. Hildebrand, 175 Ga. App. 434, 436 (1985). 
A determination of whether Place's failure to pay amo,unts due to Manhattan is a material 
breach is a question of fact for a jury and cannot be determined by summary judgment. 
Martin v. Rollins, Inc., 238 Ga. 119 (1977); Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Parr, 189 Ga. App. 
222 (1988). 
In its second argument, Manhattan contends that KSUF's negligent construction 
claim is barred by the statute of limitations. A negligent construction claim is an action for 
damages to realty, and must be brought within four years after the right of action accrues. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30(a). Manhattan argues that the Project was substantially complete no 
later than September 10, 2004, when the Georgia Fire Safety and Insurance 
Commissioner's Office conducted an "80% Inspection" of the Project, and that because 
KSUF filed its claim on September 15, 2008, the four-year statute of limitations period had 
expired. In an action involving the construction of a building or other improvement to real 
property, the period of limitations for negligent construction commences on the date the 
work was substantially complete. Scully v. First Magnolia Homes, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 892, 
893 (2004). O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50(2) holds that "'[s]ubstantial completion' means the date 
when construction was sufficiently completed, in accordance with the contract as modified 
by any change order agreed to by the parties, so that the owner could occupy the project 
for the use for which it was intended." 
The Court finds that an 80% inspection report is not sufficient to establish that the 
Project was substantially complete. There are conflicting cases in Georgia about when 
substantial completion has occurred. Manhattan cites authority stating that legal 
occupation of the project is not required to achieve substantial completion. Colormatch 
Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 275 Ga. 249, 251 (2002). Conflicting case law dictates that 
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substantial completion occurs when the premises receives a certificate of occupancy. 
Gropper v. STO Corp., 250 Ga. App. 820, 823 (2001); Scully v. First Magnolia Homes, 279 
Ga. 336, 338 (2005). Given that the Project was intended to house several hundred 
students, it is not likely that the Project would have been deemed capable of being utilized 
as a dormitory until all proper fire safety precautions and standards had been met. The 
Court finds that because the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued on September 
16, 2004, and students moved in shortly thereafter, KSUF's September 15, 2008, 
complaint was timely. Therefore, the statute of limitations does not bar KSUF's negligent 
construction claim, and summary judgment on this basis is not warranted. 
Finally, Manhattan argues that KSUF's claim based on the lack of the building wrap 
is barred by the acceptance doctrine. The acceptance doctrine holds that when (1) a 
contractor does not hold itself out as an expert in design work, (2) performs its work 
without negligence, and (3) the work is approved and accepted by the owner or the one 
who contracted for the work on the owner's behalf, the contractor is not liable for injuries 
resulting from the defective design of the work. Bragg v. Oxford Construction Co., 285 Ga. 
98, 98 (2009) citing David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 Ga. 557, 558 (1990). If, however, the 
contractor is found to be negligent in the performance of the work, it is subject to liability 
regardless of whether the owner or the one who contracted for the work accepted it. 
Bragg v. Oxford Construction Co., 285 Ga. 98 (2009). Whether Manhattan was negligent 
is a question for the jury, especially where the record shows that two KSUF experts have 
taken the position that Manhattan's work did not meet the standards of good workmanship. 
KSUF has also provided evidence to show that the original design included a building 
wrap, and that Manhattan participated in the decision to forego it. The Court thus finds 
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that the acceptance doctrine does not bar KSUF's claim because questions of fact as to 
Manhattan's negligence exist. 
For the foregoing reasons, Manhattan's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Plaintiffs claims is hereby DENIED. 
50 ORDERED this 6th day of October, 2010. 
~ \~ ~-e-D--(-
VALiCEiiBONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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